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A PERSPECTIVE OF THE QUALIFIED PLAN TAX SUBSIDY
MICHAEL A. OBERST*
INTRODUCTION
As is the case with most industrialized nations, the United
States government wants its citizens to be provided with adequate
subsistence during their retirement years. Since the enactment of
the Social Security Act of 1935, most retired and disabled Ameri-
cans have been able to depend upon Federal Old-Age, Survivors,
and Disability Insurance---"social security"-as the foundational
source of this subsistence. As social security provides only minimal
retirement benefits, it has become necessary to supplement these
benefits from other sources. Approximately 50% of the American
private sector work force looks to employer established "qualified
plans" as the necessary retirement income supplement to social
security.1
In contrast to "nonqualified plans, ' 2 qualified plans are sub-
ject to a seemingly infinite battery of requirements set forth in the
Internal Revenue Code' and the regulations and rulings of the In-
ternal Revenue Service (IRS). Compliance with these requirements
brings some major tax concessions into play. Thus, while the em-
ployer gets a deduction for contributions to the qualified plan
trust,4 neither the trust nor its employee-beneficiaries are immedi-
ately subject to income tax with respect to the contributions and
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida School of Law, B.S.B.A., University of
Florida, 1963; J.D., University of Florida, 1968. The author was formerly Legislation Coun-
sel, Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
1. PRESIDEN 'S COMM'N ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A NATIONAL RE-
TIR.MENT INCOME POLICY 34-40 (1981).
2. Essentially, a nonqualified plan is any plan deferring the receipt of compensation
which does not meet the qualified plan requirements. The tax treatment of nonqualified
plans is discussed in an ensuing section (describing the "Special Tax Treatment of Qualified
Plans").
3. See I.R.C. §§ 401-418E (1982). Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended through the 1982 edition.
4. Id. § 404(a). The employer will not receive a § 162 or a § 212 deduction, but if a plan
satisfies the conditions of either, the employer will receive a § 404(a) deduction subject to
limitations on amounts deductible described in § 404(a)(1)-(9).
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earnings thereon;5 taxation is deferred until the time that the trust
distributes benefits to the employee.' As will be explained, this
deferral of taxation represents an ever-increasing subsidy by our
government of the qualified plan system.
The qualified plan dates back to 1921,7 but, with the exception
of some significant reforms in 19388 and 1942,9 was not the subject
of any comprehensive legislation until 1974 when the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)10 was enacted. Subse-
quently, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA)11 made a number of further significant changes in the
qualified plan provisions.
Both ERISA and TEFRA address major issues as to the allo-
cation of the private pension tax subsidy: To what extent should
this subsidy be allocated to high-income individuals? More specifi-
cally, what limits should be placed upon the contributions to, or
benefits derived from, tax subsidized qualified plans? To what ex-
tent should the qualified plan system provide for the retirement
income needs of low- and middle-income individuals? More specifi-
cally, to what extent, if any, should an employer's contributions to
the social security system reduce its obligation to contribute to a
qualified plan? The purpose of this Article is to discuss whether
Congress has effectively resolved these fundamental issues.
Section I of this Article will provide a basic explanation of the
qualified plan rules1 2 and policies. Section II discusses the merit of
5. Id. §§ 402(a)(1), 501(a). The distributed amount is taxable under § 72 (relating to
annuities) in the year in which so distributed.
6. Id. § 402(a)(1).
7. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 247.
S. In the Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 165(a)(2), 52 Stat. 518 (current version at
I.I.C. § 401(a)(2)), Congress articulated for the first time that the corpus or income of a
qualified plan trust must be devoted exclusively to the benefit of the employee-beneficiaries.
9. In the Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 162(a), 56 Stat. 862 (current version at I.R.C.
§3 401(a)(4), 410(b)), Congress established standards to prevent discrimination in both em-
ployee coverage and allocation of benefits and contributions.
10. Employee Retirement Income Security Act [ERISA] of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829.
11. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act [TEFRA] of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324.
12. This Article is not intended to be a discourse on the technicalities of the qualified
plan provisions. Its purpose is to explore several fundamental issues pertaining to the merit
of qualified plans as they are presently structured. Consequently, every attempt will be
made to avoid getting sidetracked in the labyrinth of rules that comprise this overweight
body of law.
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the current limits on contributions and benefits. Section III dis-
cusses the merit of the current "integration" rules. This discussion
leads to the ultimate conclusion that the present and ever-increas-
ing qualified plan tax subsidy is wasteful because too much of it is
allocated to high-income individuals who do not need it, and too
little is allocated to middle- and, particularly, low-income individu-
als who do need it. In order to attain a more rational and humane
allocation of this subsidy, this Article calls for the elimination of
integration and the reduction of the contribution and benefit limits
to middle-income levels. These changes would cause some employ-
ers to terminate their qualified plans. For those rank and file who
lose coverage as a result of these terminations, and, more signifi-
cantly, for the massive number of rank and fie who have never
been covered, this Article introduces the only practical solution: a
minimum mandatory contribution system.
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE QUALIFIED PLAN
This Section will describe first the disparate methods of fund-
ing retirement benefits that fall under the umbrella classification,
"qualified plan." An overview will then be provided of the various
rules that must be obeyed in order for a plan to attain "qualified"
status. The overview will be followed by a description of the spe-
cial tax benefits that accrue to a qualified plan and its participants.
The final part of this Section will discuss the policies underlying
the qualified plan provisions.
A. Types of Qualified Plans
There are two basic types of qualified plans: the "defined con-
tribution plan" and the "defined benefit plan." Both of these plans
commonly are embodied in a trust'3 which serves as the recipient
and investor of contributions. These contributions plus the earn-
ings thereon will ultimately be distributed as retirement benefits.
1. Defined Benefit Plans. A defined benefit plan provides a
specified benefit to be paid annually after the participant retires.14
Thus, for example, a defined benefit plan might specify an annual
13. Instead of a trust, an employer may make deductible payments to an insurance
company towards the purchase of retirement annuities for its employees. I.R.C. § 404(a)(2).
14. Tress. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i). Unless otherwise noted, all references to regulation
sections are to those in effect in 1983.
19831
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retirement benefit until death equal to 2 % of the participant's av-
erage compensation multiplied by the number of years of service
the employee has given to the employer.15 With each "year of ser-
vice,"1 a participant in a defined benefit plan accrues a portion of
a promised annual retirement benefit.
17
In almost all cases, an actuary must be employed to estimate
the contributions that will be necessary to fund the defined benefit
plan's promised benefits. These computations necessarily involve
such assumptions as the earnings rate on trust investments, the
turnover rate of employees who leave the company's employ before
fully vesting in their otherwise earned benefits, and the life expec-
tancies of retiring participants. The risk of poor investment per-
formance falls upon the employer who ultimately must provide
enough funds at the time of retirement to deliver the promised
benefit. Since ERISA, most defined benefit plans have been sub-
ject to a governmentally administered compulsory insurance pro-
gram which guarantees, within prescribed limits, the payment of
previously vested benefits in the event of plan termination. 8
2. Defined Contribution Plans. In contrast to a defined bene-
fit plan, a defined contribution plan makes no promises as to a
specified retirement benefit. Each participant's retirement "nest
egg" is represented by an account which reflects the participant's
share of the aggregate amount of contributions and trust earnings
and losses.19 Thus, the participant in a defined contribution plan
must bear the burden of the trust's inadequate investment per-
formance. Of course, successful trust investment performance di-
rectly benefits the participant.
There are three main varieties of defined contribution plans:
the "money purchase pension plan," the "profit sharing plan," and
15. Under this example, a retiring employee with average compensation of $40,000 and
25 years of service would be entitled to an annual retirement benefit of $20,000 (2% X
$40,000 X 25).
16. Generally, a "year of service" is a designated 12-month period during which an em-
ployee performs at least 1000 hours of service. I.R.C. § 411(a)(5)(A).
17. Alternative accrual rules are set forth under I.R.C. § 411(b)(1).
18. For a comprehensive discussion of this insurance program, see M. CANAN, QUALIFIED
RETmMENT PLANS 459-500 (1977).
19. In two types of defined contribution plans, the "profit sharing plan" and the "stock
bonus plan," forfeitures of terminated employees' unvested account balances are reallocated
among, and increase, the accounts of the remaining participants. In other plans, forfeitures
may be used only to reduce future employer contributions. I.R.C. § 401(a)(8).
606 [Vol. 32
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the "stock bonus plan." The amount of the contribution to a
money purchase pension plan is determined and obligatorily made
pursuant to a formula set forth in the plan instrument.2 0 In con-
trast, the amount of the annual contribution to a profit sharing
plan may be determined according to the employer's discretion,
but it may not exceed the amount of the employer's profits.21
Thus, for a particular year, an employer may decide to make a con-
tribution to its profit sharing plan equal to 10% of its net profits
for the year. While the contributions to a profit sharing plan may
be made on a discretionary basis, the allocation of those contribu-
tions to the participants' accounts must be made pursuant to a
predetermined plan formula.22 A stock bonus plan, which itself has
some subvarieties,23 is similar to a profit sharing plan except that
the amount of the contribution is not limited by profits and the
plan is funded primarily with the stock of the employer
corporation.24
B. An Overview of the Qualified Plan Requirements
In order to be accorded favorable qualified plan treatment, a
plan must meet a number of requirements which are set forth in
the Internal Revenue Code,2 5 its concomitant regulations, and IRS
rulings. Principal among the qualified plan requirements are those
that forbid "discrimination" in favor of the "prohibited group" in
terms of both the scope of employee coverage26 and the allocation
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i). In the case of money purchase pension plans, em-
ployer contributions are fixed without being geared to profits.
21. Id. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii). In addition, profit sharing plans must not discriminate in
operation to favor certain types of employees. See id. § 1.401-3, -4; see also infra note 26
and accompanying text (discussing "prohibited groups").
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(ii).
23. One subvariation is the so-called "leveraged employee stock ownership plan"
("leveraged ESOP"). See LR.C. § 4975(d)(3), (e)(7). A leveraged ESOP borrows money from
a third party in order to acquire employer stock. Subsequently, the deductible contributions
made by the employer to the leveraged ESOP are used to pay off the third-party loan.
Another subvariation is the so-called "tax credit employee stock ownership plan" ("tax
credit ESOP"). See I.R.C. § 409A. If certain conditions are met, an employer is allowed a
special income tax credit for contributions (primarily of employer stock) to a tax credit
ESOP. The credit is limited to a prescribed percentage of the aggregate compensation of all
employees covered by the plan. Id. § 44G(a)(2). For a comprehensive discussion of these
plans, see Kaplan & Ludwig, ESOPs, 354 Tax Mgmt. 2d (BNA) at A-1 (1983).
24. Tress. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(iii).
25. See I.R.C. §§ 401-418E.
26. Id. § 410(b)(1).
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of contributions and benefits among covered employees.27 The
"prohibited group" is comprised of certain employees who may be
stockholders, officers, or those with high earnings from the rendi-
tion of personal services.28 In terms of the scope of the plan's cov-
erage of employees, the anti-discrimination test is satisfied if 56%
or more of the company's employees are covered by the plan, re-
gardless of the composition-"prohibited group" compared to rank
and file-of the employee group that is covered.29 Even if this
mathematical test is not met, the IRS may still determine that the
composition of the covered group does not result in the proscribed
discrimination."0 Under this subjective test, the IRS has approved
a plan covering 27% of all employees, 55% of those covered be-
longing to the prohibited group. 1
Discrimination is also prohibited vis-a-vis contributions to de-
fined contribution plans and benefits provided by defined benefit
plans.32 This discrimination test is met if the percentage of "total
compensation"3 3 that is represented by contributions or benefits is
at least as high for the rank and file as it is for the prohibited
group.34 For example, this discrimination test would allow contri-
butions to a defined contribution plan which were allocated to each
account in amounts equaling 15% of each participant's total com-
pensation. These contributions would be allowed because they re-
present the same proportion (15%) of both groups' total compen-
27. Id. § 401(a)(4).
28. Id. 8H 401(a)(4), 410(b)(1)(B).
29. Id. § 410(b)(1)(A). Under this provision, the anti-discrimination test is met if at
least 70% of the employees are eligible for coverage and 80% of those eligible are, in fact,
covered. Id. Alternatively, the test is satisfied if at least 70% of the employees are covered.
Id.
30. Id. § 410(b)(1)(B).
31. Rev. Rul. 83-58, 1983-1 C.B. 95. On the other hand, discrimination has been found
to exist when 42% of all employees were covered, but 83% of those covered were in the
prohibited group. Commissioner v. Pepsi-Cola Niagara Bottling Corp., 399 F.2d 390 (2d Cir.
1968).
32. An employee must commence participation in the plan within six months of his
satisfaction of certain minimum age and service requirements. I.R.C. § 410(a)(4)(B). How-
ever, if the first day of the next plan year occurs during that six-month period, participation
must begin on that day. Id. § 410(a)(4)(A). In most cases, the minimum age and service
requirements are met upon the employee's attaining age 25 and completing one year of
service. Id. § 410(a)(1)(A).
33. "Total compensation" has been defined by the IRS in a number of rulings. Essen-
tially, total compensation includes wages, commissions, bonuses, and tax-free receipts of
food and lodging. Rev. Rul. 81-74, 1981-1 C.B. 175; Rev. Rul. 73-381, 1973-2 C.B. 125.
34. I.R.C. § 401(a)(5); Rev. Rul. 81-74, 1981-1 C.B. 175.
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sation. Contributions would also be allowed if they were greater (as
a percentage of total compensation) for the rank and file than they
were for the prohibited group. In determining these proportions,
however, an employer is allowed to take into account the social se-
curity contributions it has made on behalf of the employees.3 5 The
IRS has prescribed a number of rules which detail how these social
security contributions may be taken into account.36 The merit of
these rules, commonly referred to as the "integration rules," will be
the subject of subsequent discussion."
During the time a participating employee is working and con-
tributions are being made to the qualified plan on the employee's
behalf, that employee "accrues" benefits in the plan. In a defined
contribution plan, the "accrued benefit" is represented by the ag-
gregate of all contributions, earnings, and losses which have been
allocated to the participant's account.3 8 In a defined benefit plan, a
participant's "accrued benefit" is some portion of the benefit paya-
ble at retirement age. Roughly speaking, the portion is determined
with reference to a comparison of the employee's actual number of
years of participation in the plan to the number of years of partici-
pation that would have been attained had the employee remained
a participant until the plan's specified retirement age. 9 Thus, for
example, an eleven-year participant who would have receive an es-
timated annual benefit of $30,000 after thirty-three years of partic-
ipation would currently have an accrued benefit of $10,000 (11/33
X 30,000).
Even though a participant has an accrued benefit, that benefit
may nonetheless be forfeitable. A separate set of "vesting" rules
determine the degree to which an accrued benefit is nonforfeit-
able.40 Generally, a plan may select one of three prescribed vesting
35. I.R.C. § 401(a)(5).
36. See Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-2 C.B. 187.
37. See infra notes 106-26 and accompanying text.
38. I.R.C. § 411(a)(7)(A)(ii). In the case of profit sharing and stock bonus plans, the
accrued benefit also includes any forfeitures which have been allocated to the participant's
account. Id.
39. See id. § 411(b)(1)(C). Under the so-called "3-percent method" of accrual, 3% of
the normal maximum retirement benefit must be accrued for each year of service. Id. §
411(b)(1)(A). Consequently, the proportional accrual rate described in the text (of actual
years of participation to total potential years of participation) would not obtain under this
method unless the participant had completed 33 years of service at retirement (i.e., 100%
divided by 33 years equals approximately 3%).
40. See id. § 411(a)(2).
1983]
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schedules. One commonly selected schedule is the so-called "ten-
year vesting rule," under which a participant remains "zero
vested" until he has completed ten years of service.41 Upon com-
pletion of the ten-year service period, the participant becomes
100% vested in his accrued benefit.'2 With a so-called "top-heavy
plan," to be discussed subsequently,43 the plan must choose be-
tween two relatively accelerated vesting schedules-100% after
three years of service or, starting with the second year of service,
20% annual increments resulting in 100% vesting after six years of
service."
Limits are imposed on the amount that may be added annu-
ally to a participant's account in a defined contribution plan. Thus,
the "annual addition" ' to a participant's account in a defined con-
41. Id. § 411(a)(2)(A). Section 411(d)(1)(B) forbids the use of a vesting schedule which
would tend to discriminate in favor of the prohibited group. In order to comply with this
proscription, some of the newer and smaller companies that might be tempted by this type
of discrimination have adopted a legislatively suggested "4-40" safe harbor vesting schedule.
Under the 4-40 vesting schedule, the participant becomes 40% vested after four years of
service, with additional viesting of 5% for each of the next two years and 10% for each of
the following five years. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 276-77, 1974-3 C.B. 415,
437-38, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 935.
42. I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(A). Under § 411(a)(2)(B) (5 to 15 year vesting), the participant
becomes 25% vested after five years of service, with additional vesting of 5% for each of the
next five years and 10% for each of the following five years. Under § 411(a)(2)(C)(i) (Rule of
45), the vesting percentage corresponds to the sum of both years of service and age. Thus:
If years of and sum of age and then the nonforfeitable
service service equals or percentage
equal or exceeds - is -
exceed -
5 45 50
6 47 60
7 49 70
8 51 80
9 53 90
10 55 100
Even if the threshold sum of 45 (employee's age plus the number of years of service) is not
attained, any participant (younger than age 35) with 10 years of service would be 50%
vested, with additional 10% vesting for each subsequent year of service. I.R.C. §411(a)(2) (C) (ii).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 148-58.
44. I.R.C. § 416(b)(1) (special rules for top-heavy plans).
45. The "annual addition" equals the sum of employer contributions, employee contri-
butions exceeding 6% of compensation, and, in the case of profit sharing and stock bonus
plans, forfeitures. Id. § 415(c)(2). In the event that employee contributions exceed 12% of
compensation, then one-half of those contributions, rather than the excess over 6% of com-
pensation, is taken into account in determining the annual addition. Id.
QUALIFIED PLAN TAX SUBSIDY
tribution plan may not exceed the lesser of 25% of compensation
or $30,000.46 Beginning in 1986, the $30,000 alternative limit on the
annual addition will be subject to an annual cost of living
adjustment. 7
Limits are also imposed on the annual benefit that ultimately
will be payable at retirement. Thus, the annual retirement benefit"
payable by a defined benefit plan may not exceed the lesser of ei-
ther 100% of the average of the participant's three highest consec-
utive years of compensation, or $90,000.48 Starting in 1986, the
$90,000 alternative limit will be subject to an annual cost of living
adjustment. e
Overall limits are imposed on employees who are covered by
both a defined contribution plan and a defined benefit plan. For
higher-paid employees in this situation, no more than 125 % of the
defined contribution and defined benefit plan dollar limits may be
used.50 Thus, with respect to an employee with annual compensa-
tion of $120,000, a $30,000 annual addition may be made to the
employee's defined contribution plan account, and a $22,500 an-
nual retirement benefit may be promised under a defined benefit
plan. The 125% limit is not exceeded since the $30,000 annual ad-
dition equals 100% of the defined contribution plan dollar limit
($30,000/$30,000) and the $22,500 annual retirement benefit equals
25% of the defined benefit plan dollar limit ($22,500/$90,000). 5'
C. Special Tax Treatment of Qualifed Plans
Certain retirement plans do not meet the qualified plan re-
quirements and they are therefore referred to as "nonqualifed
plans." A brief description of the tax treatment of nonqualified
46. Id. § 415(c)(1).
47. Id. § 415(d)(1)(B), (d)(3).
48. Id. § 415(b)(1). The annual retirement benefit serving as the standard against which
the limits are to be applied is a straight life annuity payable between ages 62 and 65. Id. §
415(b)(2)(A). Adjustments must be made to the dollar limit if the benefit is payable in a
form other than a straight life annuity. See id. § 415(b)(2)(B). Adjustments must also be
made to the dollar limit, so that it is equivalent to the standard benefit described above, if
the benefit is payable either prior to age 62 or after age 65. See id. § 415(b)(2)(C)-(E).
49. Id. § 415(d)(1)(A), (d)(3).
50. Id. § 415(e)(3)(B)(i). For other employees, no more than 140% of the limitations
may be used. Id. § 415(e)(3)(B)(ii).
51. The 125% limit also would be met in the case of a $7500 annual addition (25% of
$30,000 limit) and a $90,000 annual retirement benefit (100% of $90,000 limit).
1983]
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plans is helpful in understanding the special tax treatment ac-
corded qualified plans.
A contribution to a nonqualifed plan is includible in the em-
ployee's income for the year in which the nonforfeitable right to
ultimately receive that contribution is attained.52 Correspondingly,
the deduction of the employer's contribution is allowed for the
year in which the contribution is includible in the employee's in-
come.58 Moreover, the trust serving as the funding mechanism of a
nonqualified plan is subject to a tax each year on its income.5 4
Subject to various limits, an employer making a contribution
to a "qualified plan" on behalf of its employees is entitled to a
deduction with respect to the taxable year in which the contribu-
tion is considered to have been made.55 On the other hand, the
employees for whom the contribution is made do not have to in-
clude any amount in income until the year in which a distribution
is made to them by the trust.56 Consequently, there may be a con-
siderable period of time-twenty, thirty, or forty years-between
the year that the deductible contribution is made and the year that
it is included in income. During this time, all of the trust's income
on its investments is exempt from taxation.5
Other tax benefits flow from the qualifed plan. The retirement
benefits may be paid out over the employee's retirement years. A
plan, for example, might provide for an annuity of $25,000 per year
to be paid over the remainder of the employee's life. Even though
these payments are taxed as ordinary income, they usually are re-
ceived at a time in life when the employee's overall income and
corresponding marginal tax rate are below what they were during
his active working years. Moreover, if upon retirement the em-
ployee receives a "lump sum distribution,"" special capital gains
52. I.R.C. § 402(b). Many nonqualified plans are not funded, and involve nothing more
than the employer's unsecured promise that the deferred compensation will be paid at some
future date. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
53. LPC. § 404(a)(5).
54. See Philadelphia-Baltimore Exch. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 355 (1957); Lincoln
Elec. Co. Employee's Profit-Sharing Trust v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 598 (1950), rev'd on
other grounds, 190 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1951).
55. Id. § 404(a).
56. Id. § 402(a)(1).
57. Id. § 501(a).
58. Essentially, a "lump sum distribution" is a distribution during one taxable year to
the participant of the total amount accumulated for that participant. Id. § 402(e)(4)(A).
Moreover, the distribution must have been made as a result of the occurrence of one of
[Vol. 32
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and averaging treatment obtain59 so that the rate of taxation for
the year of distribution is usually much lower than it would have
been had the contribution been taxed the year it was made. An-
other special tax feature of qualified plans is the $100,000 estate
tax exclusion applicable to non-lump sum amounts payable after
the participant's death.60
The combination of the employer's current deduction for qual-
ified plan contributions and the deferred taxation, usually at lower
rates, of these contributions and the earnings thereon results in a
significant amount of postponed tax revenue."e In effect, the gov-
ernment is making a long-term, interest-free loan of these post-
poned taxes. The losses attributable to these interest-free loans are
substantial. For fiscal year 1984, this amount has been estimated
at $34 billion. 2 By 1988, this figure will reach an estimated $65
billion.6 3 Of all the "tax expenditures" resulting from various tax
provisions allowing income exclusions, tax.credits, deductions, and
preferential tax rates," the net exclusion of qualified plan contri-
butions and earnings ranks first, 5 representing approximately 10%
of all tax expenditures for fiscal year 198466 and 13 % for fiscal year
certain prescribed events. Corporate and noncorporate qualified plan participants (or their
beneficiaries) receive lump sum distribution treatment when the distribution is occasioned
by the participant's death, attainment of age 59.5, or termination of employment. Id. §
402(e)(4)(A)(i)-(iii). However, sole proprietors and more than 10% partners do not qualify
for this treatment where termination of employment was the impetus for the distribution.
Id. § 402(e)(4)(A). Only sole proprietors and more than 10% partners qualify for this treat-
ment where disability (prior to age 59.5) triggers the distribution. Id.
59. Id. § 402(a)(2), (e)(1).
60. Id. § 2039(c), (g). The exclusion also applies to otherwise lump sum distributions
where the beneficiaries elect to forego the special capital gains and averaging treatments. Id.
§ 2039(f)(2).
61. To the extent that the taxes paid on distribution are less than the overall taxes that
would have been imposed both at the times contributions were made and the times the trust
had earnings, it is really a matter of lost, rather than postponed, revenue.
62. See STAFF OF JonT Com. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 1ST SEss., ESTmATES OF FED-
ERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1983-1988, at 16 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter
cited as JCT TAX ExpENDrrtu EsTmATs]. This report estimates a fiscal year 1984 tax
expenditure of $57.6 billion for both government and private sector plans. Id. The staff
member responsible for these estimates has, in a telephone conversation, informed the au-
thor that approximately 59% of this expenditure ($34 billion) is attributable to private sec-
tor qualified plans.
63. Id. This report estimates a fiscal year 1984 tax expenditure of $110.25 billion for
both government and private sector plans. Id. Thus, 59% = $65 billion.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 10-17.
66. Id. at 18. This report reflects total fiscal year 1984 tax expenditures of $327.5 bil-
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D. Policies Underlying Qualified Plan Provisions
There are no significant economic differences between a quali-
fied plan and a funded nonqualified plan 8 that might justify the
disparity in taxation of these plans. Rather, it is a social policy
rationale which underlies the qualified plan provisions.
The primary policy goal of the qualified plan provisions is to
encourage employers to provide retirement savings for their em-
ployees. " The broad objective of ERISA was to increase the num-
ber of individuals participating in, and actually receiving benefits
from, employer-financed plans.70 Congress noted its awareness of
the voluntary nature of the private pension system and the obvious
concern of employers over the additional cost in meeting this
objective:
Generally it would appear that the wider or more comprehensive the cov-
erage, vesting and funding, the more desirable it is from the standpoint of
national policy. However, since. . . the institution of new pension plans and
increases in benefits depend upon employer willingness to participate or ex-
pand a plan, it is necessary to take into account additional costs from the
standpoint of the employer. If employers respond to more comprehensive
coverage, vesting, and funding rules by decreasing benefits under existing
lion. Id. The fiscal year 1984 tax expenditure of $34 billion for private sector qualified plans
represents approximately 10.4% of the total expenditures.
67. Id. This report reflects total fiscal year 1988 tax expenditures of $490.9 billion. Id.
The fiscal year 1988 tax expenditure of $65 billion for private sector qualified plans repre-
sents approximately 13.2% of the total expenditures.
68. Like a qualified plan, a funded nonqualified plan usually entails employer contribu-
tions to a trust which ultimately will distribute retirement benefits to the covered employee-
beneficiaries.
69. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1942); S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4890, 4898-99. Some con-
tend that a significant underlying purpose of qualified plan deferred taxation is to provide
an averaging device for personal service income. This averaging device, it is contended,
serves to provide some tax parity between service performance income, which, without
deferral, would be "bunched" into the service performer's working career, and income de.
rived from capital investment, which is spread out on a relatively even basis over the capital
owner's life. Snyder & Weckstein, Quasi-Corporations, Quasi-Employees and Quasi-Tax
Relief for Professional Persons, 48 CORNELL L. REv. 613, 702 (1963). While the qualified
plan provisions do have the effect of averaging service performance income, the pertinent
1921-1982 legislative history fails to indicate a congressional intent to provide any tax parity
between this income and capital investment income.
70. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4890, 4898.
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plans or slowing the rate of formation of new plans, little if any would be
gained from the standpoint of securing broader use of employee pensions and
related plans. At the same time, there are advantages in setting minimum
standards... to serve as a guideline for employers in establishing or improv-
ing plans and also to prevent the promise of more in the form of pensions or
related benefits than eventually is available.
7
'
Thus, in many cases, the provisions of ERISA represent a compro-
mise between the desire to enhance employee benefits and the ne-
cessity of controlling employer cost.72
A seemingly logical way of containing employer cost is to re-
duce the benefits that the highly paid employee may accrue. In
many cases, however, an employer's primary inducement to estab-
lish a qualified plan is to add an attractive component to the over-
all compensation package provided these individuals. In closely
held companies, where many or all of the highly paid employees
are also stockholders in the company, there obviously is an acute
interest in establishing a qualified plan benefitting these employee-
stockholders. In these contexts, the cost of providing benefits to
the highly paid employees is not the greatest concern of the em-
ployer; on the contrary, the concern is the upper limit imposed on
contributions and benefits for the highly paid employee. Thus, in
attempting to provide employers with an adequate incentive to es-
tablish qualified plans covering low- and middle-income individu-
als, Congress has been pressured to set high upper limits on the
contributions and benefits for the highly paid employees who are
also plan participants. In setting such limits, however, Congress
had to guard against providing an excessive tax deferral for these
employees. Congress grappled with this issue in 1974 and again in
1982. The ensuing section deals with how well Congress has re-
solved the issue of excessive deferral.
71. Id. at 18-19, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4890, 4904.
72. The "employer cost" referred to is the additional cost of making overall contribu-
tions that results from allowing earlier participation and earlier vesting for those employees
who, for the lack of lengthy employment, would not otherwise earn a significant vested ben-
efit. Lower-paid employees, particularly women and minorities, tend to have a higher job
turnover rate than middle- and higher-paid employees. PRES NV'S COMM'N ON PENSION
POLICY, supra note 1, at 27-28. Consequently, a disproportionate part of the additional cost
is attributable to the provision of earlier participation and vesting for these employees.
However, this additional cost can be avoided in most cases by the use of integration. See
infra notes 106-84 and accompanying text.
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II. LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFITS
A. Evolution of Limits on Contributions and Benefits
In 1921, when employer plans were few in number, the quali-
fied plan provisions quietly crept into the law with very little legis-
lative consideration." During the fifty-three-year period preceding
.the enactment of ERISA, no direct limitations were imposed on
corporate qualified plans with respect to either the annual contri-
bution to defined contribution plans or the annual benefit from de-
fined benefit plans.74 Indirect limitations existed in the form of re-
strictions on the amount of deductible contributions, but
nondeductible contributions were not subject to tax until they
were distributed.7
5
In contrast to the treatment afforded qualified plans of corpo-
rations, the qualified plans of unincorporated businesses (com-
monly referred to as "H.R. 10 plans")76 were subject to rather se-
vere contribution limits pertaining to the "owner-employee,"
someone defined essentially as a sole proprietor or more than 10%
partner. 7 These plans were allowed to make no more than $2500
of deductible contributions plus $2500 of nondeductible contribu-
tions for each owner-employee. 8
ERISA imposed specific contribution and benefit limits on
corporate qualified plans-an annual addition not exceeding
73. See supra note 7; see also Goodman, Legislative Development of the Federal Tax
Treatment of Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 49 TAXES 226, 227 (1971). Cf. authority
cited supra note 71.
74. H.R. RE. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 110-11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4670, 4775-76 [hereinafter cited as ERISA REPORT]. However, Rev. Rul. 72-3,
1972-1 C.B. 105, prohibited annual retirement benefits which exceeded the employee's
compensation.
75. ERISA REPORT, supra note 74, at 110-11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4775-76. Morever, the trust earnings attributable to nondeductible employee con-
tributions were (and remained) nontaxable until the time of distribution.
76. This term is being used broadly to include also the qualified plans of so-called
"Subchapter S corporations." Because these corporations, like partnerships, pass income
and deductions directly through to the entity-owners, their qualified plans have been sub-
ject to essentially the same treatment as partnership and proprietorship qualified plans. See
I.R.C. § 1379 (1970), repealed by Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96
Stat. 1669 (effective Jan. 1, 1984).
77. I.R.C. § 401(c)(3) (1976). With Subchapter S corporations, the shareholder-em-
ployer owning more than 5% of the corporation's stock was the target of the contribution
restrictions. I.R.C. § 1379(d) (1970).
78. ERISA REPORT, supra note 74, at 110, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4775.
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$25,000 or 25% of compensation, and an annual benefit not ex-
ceeding the lesser of $75,000 or 100% of the average of the em-
ployee's three highest consecutive years of compensation. 79 It also
increased (from $2500 to $7500) the maximum amount that could
be contributed on a deductible basis to H.R. 10 plans, while con-
tinuing the pre-ERISA limit of $2,500 on nondeductible contribu-
tions.80 The committee report pertaining to these changes provides:
Your committee recognizes the importance of tax incentives in creating a
strong private pension system. At the same time, however, your committee
believes it is appropriate to provide some limitations to prevent the accumu-
lation of corporate pensions out of tax-sheltered dollars which are swollen
completely out of proportion to the reasonable need of individuals for a dig-
nified level of retirement income. Moreover, by imposing limitations on cor-
porate plans, and liberalizing the limitations which are imposed under pre-
sent law on H.R. 10 plans, the Bill takes a long step forward to achieving tax
equity in this area.... These provisions [pertaining to corporate qualified
plans] do not limit the size of the pension which the employee may receive
from a nonqualifed plan, which is financed out of taxed dollars. The only
effect of the provisions is to limit the size of the pension which is subsidized
by the tax laws.81
The $25,000 and $75,000 contribution and benefit limitations
were made subject to annual cost of living adjustments. 2 By 1982,
these limits had been raised to $45,475 and $136,425, respec-
tively.8 3 The obvious question in 1982, to use the ERISA commit-
tee report language, was whether "the accumulation of corporate
pensions out of tax-sheltered dollars. . .[had] swollen completely
out of proportion to the reasonable needs of individuals for a dig-
nified level of retirement income. '8 4 The congressional response
embodied in TEFRA was that the dollar limits should be lowered
79. ERISA § 2004(a)(2), 88 Stat. 829, 980-82 (1974) (current version at I.R.C. §415(b)(1), (c)(1)).
80. This change is codified at ERISA § 2004(b), (e)(3), 88 Stat. 829, 952, 954-55 (1974)
(current version at I.R.C. §§ 1379(b)(1), 401(e)). The pre-ERISA limit on nondeductible
contributions is discussed in the ERISA REPORT, supra note 74, at 110, 113, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4775, 4778.
81. ERISA REPORT, supra note 74, at 112-13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws at 4777-78 (emphasis added).
82. ERISA § 2004(a)(2), 88 Stat. 829, 983 (1974) (current version at I.R.C. § 415(d)).
83. I.R. 82-18: Employee Benefit Plans, 9 FED. TAxEs (P-H) 54,796 (News Release
Feb. 3, 1982).
84. ERISA REPORT, supra note 74, at 112, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 4777.
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to $30,00011 and $90,000, a6 respectively. TEFRA also established
parity between corporate and H.R. 10 qualified plans; both will
now be subject to the same contribution and benefit limits.8 7 Start-
ing once again in 1986, these limits will be subject to cost of living
adjustments."'
B. Merit of Current Limits on Contributions and Benefits
Tax expenditures are not subject to any structured periodic
review.89 In contrast, direct federal expenditures are subject to an-
nual budgetary and appropriation reviews by Congress and the ex-
ecutive branch. This distinction raises questions as to whether the
size and allocation of the qualified plan subsidy would differ if it
took the form of a direct federal expenditure instead of a tax
expenditure.
Consider what might happen if Congress were to contemplate
a direct expenditure program under which individuals would be
encouraged to save for their retirement. One way of achieving this
goal would be to match a certain percentage of the savings put
aside by an individual in some account similar to an "IRA."90 For
example, if, in a particular year, an individual set aside $1000, the
government would make a 10% matching contribution of $100. In
formulating this program, Congress would have to determine who
would be eligible for this subsidy. This determination would natu-
rally be made by keeping in mind the initial need for such a pro-
gram. The social security system does not provide an income which
affords an adequate and dignified retirement subsistence for most
Americans; this goal can only be attained by individual savings
which would supplement social security. The individuals who must
be encouraged and assisted to set aside these savings are those
85. TEFRA § 235(a)(2), 96 Stat. 324, 505 (1982) (amending I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)).
86. Id. § 235(a)(1) (amending I.R.C. § 415(b)(1)).
87. Id. § 238, 96 Stat. 512-13 (amending I.R.C. §§ 404(e), 401(j), 1379).
88. Id. § 235(b)(2), 96 Stat. 505 (amending I.R.C. § 415 (d)).
89. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
90. Essentially, an "IRA," or "Individual Retirement Account," is a tax.exempt trust to
which an individual can make annual deductible contributions not exceeding the lesser of
$2000 ($2250 in the case of a married couple with one nonworking spouse) or 100% of com-
pensation. I.R.C. §§ 219(a), (b)(1), (c), 408(a), (e)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Amounts dis-
tributed are treated as ordinary income and, except for disability cases, there is an addi-
tional 10% tax with respect to distributions occurring before age 59.5. I.R.C. § 408(d)(1), (f)
(1976).
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with the least ability to save. High-income individuals have the
ability to save and do not need governmental assistance in this re-
gard. It therefore would be illogical and wasteful for the govern-
ment to provide unneeded assistance to these individuals. Conse-
quently, if the issue of governmental subsidization of retirement
savings were being considered for the first time in the context of
an appropriated expenditure, this subsidy would in all likelihood
be directed almost exclusively to the people who need it-lower-
and middle-income individuals. Of course, the issue has not been
considered in this context, and the outcome has been quite differ-
ent. An examination of the amounts that high-income individuals
can accumulate under the qualified plan provisions is revealing.
It is possible under the current qualified plan provisions for an
individual earning $120,000 or more annually to accumulate ap-
proximately $8.6 million by age sixty-five.91 This accumulation
could buy a sixty-five year old male retiree a single life annuity of
approximately $1 million per year.92 Moreover, if the individual
had also been funding an IRA, 3 an additional $560,000 could be
accumulated by age sixty-five . 4 This would bring the total tax-de-
91. This computation is made on the assumption that participation begins at age 25
and continues to age 65 in both a defined contribution plan and a defined benefit plan. The
maximum $30,000 contribution is made in each of 40 years to the defined contribution plan
and the defined benefit plan is funded in order to provide 25% of the maximum annual
benefit of $90,000; i.e., $22,500. This combination of 100% of the defined contribution limit
and 25% of the defined benefit limit meets the 125% upper limit applicable to combined
plans. I.R.C. § 415(e)(1)-(3). Assuming an annual 8% earnings rate over a 40-year period
(ages 25-65) and a 15-year life expectancy after retirement, the defined contribution plan
would accumulate $8,393,430 and the defined benefit plan would accumulate $192,578-a
total of $8,586,008.
If our hypothetical employee did not begin participation until age 35, the defined contri-
bution plan accumulation after 30 years, assuming an 8% annual earnings rate, would be
$3,670,380. With the defined benefit plan accumulation of $192,578, the total accumulation
at age 65 would be $3,862,958.
If our hypothetical employee did not begin participation until age 45, the defined contri-
bution plan accumulation after 20 years, assuming an 8% annual earnings rate, would be
$1,482,690. With the defined benefit plan accumulation of $192,578, the total accumulation
at age 65 would be $1,675,268.
None of the above computations takes into account the annual inflation adjustments to
the dollar limits.
92. Assuming a 15-year life expectancy and an 8% annual earnings rate, the defined
contribution plan accumulation of $8,393,430 could buy an annuity of $962,894. When this
annuity is combined with the $22,500 defined benefit plan annuity, the total annuity be-
comes $985,394.
93. See supra note 90.
94. Assuming $2000 contributions for each of 40 years, with an annual earnings rate of
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ferred savings to $9.2 million. Clearly, $9.2 million provides far in
excess of the "reasonable needs of [an] individual ... for a digni-
fied level of retirement."' 5 Moreover, by foregoing income taxation
of one individual over a forty-year period on amounts ultimately
totalling as much as $9.2 million, this country is providing an un-
justifiable tax subsidy which seriously erodes the income tax base
and undermines the already shaken public confidence in the fair-
ness of our tax system.
Even if the amount of contributions and trust earnings
shielded from taxation were the same for low-, middle-, and high-
income individuals, the subsidy per dollar of tax-deferred contri-
butions and earnings would still be greater for the high-income in-
dividual. For example, while the tax deferral on a $2000 contribu-
tion for an individual having a marginal tax bracket of 50% would
be $1000, the tax deferral on that same contribution for an individ-
ual having an 18% marginal tax bracket" would only be $360. The
tax subsidy for the high-income individual is almost three times as
great as that for the middle-income individual.
It can be argued that the tax deferral involved here, like all
deductions and exclusions, appropriately yields a greater dollar
savings for the high-bracket taxpayer. While this argument is cer-
tainly logical with respect to the deduction of various expenses re-
lated to the generation of the income that has put the taxpayer in
a high tax bracket,9 7 it is questionable in the context of a tax defer-
ral provision which owes its existence to the government's social
policy of providing a dignified level of retirement income to its citi-
zens. Regardless of its form, public aid should not increase as the
need for this aid decreases.
It can also be argued that if the contribution and benefit lim-
its were lowered for higher-paid employees, plans would be
amended to provide a lower contribution or benefit structure for
the rank and file. As the following illustration demonstrates, such a
result is not compelled. Assume, under the current limits, a pen-
8%, $559,562 would be accumulated by age 65.
95. ERISA REPORT, supra note 74, at 112, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs at 4777.
96. For taxable years beginning after 1983, the range of taxable income subject to the
joint return tax rate of 18% is $16,000-$20,200. I.R.C. § 1(a)(3).
97. The argument would also be logical with respect to the charitable deduction. In this
situation, the ability to give aid, in contrast to the need to receive it, increases as income
rises.
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sion plan provides for annual contributions equal to the lesser of
either 25% of compensation or $30,000. One of the participants, A,
earns $150,000 a year and, therefore, has $30,000 contributed to
the plan each year on his behalf. Another participant, B, earns
$10,000 a year and, therefore, has $2500 contributed to the plan
each year on his behalf. Assume now that Congress changes the
contribution limits to the lesser of 25% of compensation or $10,000
(decreased from $30,000). The plan could simply be amended to
provide contributions not in excess of the new limits, thereby re-
sulting in annual contributions of $10,000 and $2500 to A and B,
respectively. In relation to salary, B, the low-income individual,
would be receiving a substantially greater percentage ($2500 -
$10,000 = 25%) of tax-subsidized contribution than A ($10,000 -
$150,000 = 6.66%), the high-income individual. However, if we as-
sume that A is in the 50% tax bracket and B is in the 15% tax
bracket and then compare the tax deferral in relation to compensa-
tion, we see that the amount of tax deferral for A, $5000 (50% of
$10,000), is only a slightly lesser proportion of his salary ($5000 -
$150,000 = 3.33%) than the tax deferral for B, $375 (15% of
$2500), in relation to his salary ($375 -+- $10,000 = 3.75%). Thus,
substantially lowered contribution and benefit limits could bring
about something approaching rationality in terms of the relation of
this socially motivated tax deferral to the amounts of compensa-
tion of high- and low-income individuals.
With respect to the above illustration, the high-limit propo-
nents would point out that many plans would not only lower the
dollar limit to $10,000, but would also lower the percentage to the
point at which the higher-paid individuals would still receive the
maximum $10,000 amount. Thus, in the above illustration, the
plan would lower the contribution percentage to 6.66%. This
would still result in a $10,000 contribution for A, but would lower
the contribution for B to $666, a 73% reduction of $1834 ($2500 -
$666). The percentage of tax deferral in relation to compensation
for A (3.33)98 would now be more than three times as much as that
for B (1.00). 9 This is an example of the economic hardball that
would inevitably be played-if it were not foreseen and prevented.
98. The tax deferral would be $5000 (50% of $10,000). A $5000 tax deferral - $150,000
= 3.33%.
99. The tax deferral would be $100 (15% of $666). A $100 tax deferral - $10,000
1%.
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The way to prevent this inequitable allocation of the qualified plan
tax subsidy is to also limit the amount of compensation that a plan
may take into account in determining the amounts of contributions
and benefits. Accordingly, the upper limit on compensation could
be set at some modest level such as $40,000. If A is to receive the
full $10,000 contribution, the plan would have to set the contribu-
tion percentage at 25 o, which would enable B to receive the $2500
contribution.
The ultimate and most cogent argument of the high-limit pro-
ponents is that lowered contribution and benefit limits, particu-
larly when combined with limits on the compensation to be taken
into account, would result in the termination of many qualified
plans.100 High-limit proponents argue that these changes would
substantially reduce the attractiveness of this deferred compensa-
tion device for higher-paid employees, and therefore the employer
would no longer have any incentive to maintain a qualified plan.
Instead, the employer would establish nonqualified plans exclu-
sively for the higher-paid employees, 10 1 leaving the rank and fie
with no form of deferred compensation plan.
In response to such threats, it should first be noted that no
real loss is suffered upon the termination of those plans whose use
of the eligibility, vesting, and integration rules has resulted in the
provision of little or no retirement security for the rank and file
employees. Nonetheless, a good number of plans do provide some
100. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATzON, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., DESCRIPTION OF POSSI-
BLE OPTIONS TO INCREASE REVENUES, 63 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as REVENUE
OPTIONs].
101. Title I of ERISA contains a number of non-tax rules which are subject to enforce-
ment through federal district court suits brought by plan fiduciaries, participants, or the
Labor Department. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1132 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Except for the sanction,
the Title I participation, benefit accrual, vesting, and funding rules are almost identical to
the tax rules contained in Title II of ERISA. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1054, 1081-1082
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) with I.R.C. §§ 410-412 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). However, at least
initially, Title I applies to both qualified and nonqualified plans. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)-(3),
1003(a), 1051, 1081 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). A major exception to the application of these
provisions obtains for those plans which are "unfunded and... maintained... primarily
for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group of management or
highly compensated employees. . . ." 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1081(a)(3) (1976). Title I also
exempts unfunded "excess benefit plan[s]" that provide for the future payment of those
contributions and benefits which exceed the applicable contribution and benefit limits of
I.R.C. § 415. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(5) (1976). Thus, in order to avoid the rigorous Title I
participation, benefit accrual, vesting, and funding rules, a nonqualified plan must be both
unfunded and exclusively for the benefit of the higher-paid employees.
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retirement security for the rank and file. The number of these
plans that would terminate as the result of the lowering of the con-
tribution, benefit, and compensation limits depends to a great ex-
tent on the degree of confidence that higher-paid employees would
have in the nonqualified plans which would serve as their alterna-
tive deferred compensation vehicles.
While there are many variations, the typical nonqualified plan
consists of nothing more than the employer's unsecured promise to
pay a certain amount of deferred compensation in the future.10 2
Because the agreement to defer is made prior to the time the com-
pensation is earned, and the employee has received nothing but
the unsecured promise of the employer, taxation (and the em-
ployer's deduction) is deferred to the time that the employer ful-
fills its promise and makes the agreed-upon payments.103 While tax
deferral is achieved under this arrangement, the employee does not
have the security provided by a qualified plan of actually having
the deferred compensation set aside and waiting in a trust fund.
This lack of tangible security may not be a problem for an execu-
tive of General Motors or Exxon, but, in these quickly changing
and very uncertain economic times, there are very few employees
who can assuredly say that their employer will be in existence and
financially solvent to pay a promised retirement benefit in ten,
twenty, or thirty years. Consequently, because of the security it
provides, many higher-paid employees would probably want to
continue having part of their deferred compensation funded under
a qualified plan, with the remaining amount of their deferred com-
pensation which exceeds the lowered limits being subject to some
sort of nonqualified plan. In short, while it is not nearly as bounti-
ful as previous days, most highly-paid employees would still opt
for some qualified plan retirement security rather than none.
102. See supra note 101 for the reasons that a nonqualified plan would probably not be
funded. An additional reason to choose an unfunded plan stems from one of the tax rules.
An employee's share of a funded, nonqualified plan is currently taxed unless that share is
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. LR.C. §§ 83, 402(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c). Since
a substantial risk of forfeiture (e.g., forfeiture upon failure to maintain employment until
the designated distribution date) might result in the loss of benefits, many employees opt
for the unfunded, nonqualified plan. While less secure, the unfunded, nonqualified plan de-
fers taxation without necessarily entailing a forfeiture provision. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1
C.B. 174-81. But see Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B. 698 (requiring a forfeiture provision in
the event of an election to defer which is made subsequent to the rendition of services that
gave rise to the deferred compensation).
103. I.R.C. § 404(a)(5); Rev. Ru. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174-81.
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Notwithstanding the drawbacks of nonqualified plans, sub-
stantially lowered contribution, benefit, and compensation limits
would serve as the impetus for the termination of a good number
of qualified plans. These lowered limits would probably prove more
unsettling to smaller, closely-held companies which tend to view
the qualified plan as a deferred profit plan primarily for the bene-
fit of the employee-stockholders. Consequently, a high percentage
of the plan terminations would be attributable to these companies.
Any qualified plan termination would cause immediate full
vesting in all funded accrued benefits. 10 4 Consequently, the partici-
pants in these terminated plans would not lose the benefits that
thus far had accrued. However, while there may be some increase
in current compensation for employees as a result of the elimina-
tion of the employer's cost of contributing to the qualified plan,
the rank and file employee would be left in the same predicament
as that of approximately 50% of all rank and file employ-
ees-lacking any structured, employer-administered, retirement
savings plan. Of course, these employees could always put some
money into an IRA,105 but this is very hard to do with a limited
disposable income. In most cases, consumption will win out over
savings, and rank and file employees ultimately will have less re-
tirement security as a result of the termination of those qualified
plans that provided modest contributions and benefits.
Perhaps the very real prospect of this loss should give one
pause to reconsider the wisdom of lowering the limits; even if a
regal subsidy is provided for the higher paid, it may be worthwhile
so long as a substantial number of the rank and file are also reap-
ing some benefits. The next Section analyzes this prospect by fo-
cusing on the effect of the integration rules upon the ability of the
rank and file to obtain a meaningful share of this subsidy.
III. INTEGRATION
A. An Overview of Integration Rules
In 1942 Congress decided that a qualified plan should not be
allowed to discriminate in favor of officers, shareholders, or highly
compensated employees. 106 As previously described, 0 7 the anti-dis-
104. I.R.C. § 411(d)(3).
105. See supra note 85.
106. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 162(a), 56 Stat. 862.
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crimination rules relate both to the breadth of employee coverage
and the allocation of contributions and benefits among the covered
employees. In regard to the allocation of contributions and bene-
fits, the percentage of "total compensation" that is represented by
contributions or benefits must be at least as high for the rank and
file as it is for the prohibited group.108
At the same time that Congress prescribed the anti-discrimi-
nation requirements, it also sanctioned the use of "integration."10 9
In determining the percentages of total compensation that is repre-
sented by contributions or benefits for both the prohibited and
rank and file groups, the integration rules allow the employer to
take into account either the social security contributions it has
made on behalf of the employees or the social security benefits to
be derived from these contributions.
Integration therefore provides for the coordination of two re-
tirement plans-the social security system and the qualified plan.
Equal amounts of social security taxes are imposed annually on
employer and employee with respect to a limited amount of the
employees' wages. The limit on annual wages subject to social se-
curity taxes is referred to as the "taxable wage base." As a result of
various enactments and built-in indexing, the taxable wage base
has increased from $3000 in 1942, to $37,800 in 1984. A retiree's
social security benefits are determined with reference to his "aver-
age indexed monthly earnings. ' 1 ° The maximum amount of yearly
earnings taken into account in computing the retiree's average in-
dexed monthly earnings corresponds to an average of the taxable
wage bases in effect during that individual's career ("covered
compensation")."'
107. See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
108. Id.
109. In speaking on the integration of pension plans with the social security system, the
committee report provided that-
[A] plan in good faith designed to supplement the benefits under the Social Se-
curity Act ... by making eligibility to the benefits of the plan dependent upon
an employee receiving annual compensation in excess of $3000, will not be con-
sidered by reason of that fact as based upon favoritism to high compensated
employees.
H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong, 2d Sess. 104 (1942).
110. D. MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 11 (1979).
111. Rev. Rul. 71-446, § 2.03, 1971-2 C.B. 187, 188. The taxable wage bases of concern
to a 1983 retiree are: $3600 for 1954; $4200 for 1955-1958; $4800 for 1959-1965; $6600 for
1966-1967; $7800 for 1968-1971; $9000 for 1972; $10,800 for 1973; $13,200 for 1974; $14,100
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To the extent that social security benefits are attributable to
employer-paid taxes, integration treats the social security system
as an employer plan, the purpose of which is to provide a certain
level of wage replacement with respect to each employee's covered
compensation. Thus, if the other employer plan, the qualified plan,
provides the same percentage of wage replacement with respect to
compensation in excess of covered compensation as that provided
by the employer's social security plan with respect to covered com-
pensation, the two benefits together would provide a nondiscrimi-
natory benefit for all employees. For example, if it were deter-
mined that employer-paid taxes were providing social security
benefits that represented 37.5% of covered compensation, then no
discrimination would occur if the employer's qualified plan only
provided benefits equal to 37.5% of compensation in excess of cov-
ered compensation. No discrimination occurs because the two
plans, viewed together, provide both rank and file and prohibited
group employees with the same percentage (37.5) of wage
replacement.
A qualified plan may be integrated under either the "excess
method" or the "offset method." Under the excess method, which
has a number of different formulations, social security is taken into
account by providing contributions or benefits only with respect to
compensation above the "integration level."1 '2 Over the years, the
IRS has developed a body of excess method rules which pertain to
the appropriate selection of both the "integration level" and the
percentage of contributions or benefits with respect to compensa-
tion above this level. The "integration level" is that level of com-
pensation below which no contributions or benefits need be pro-
vided.11 3 The acceptable integration level alternatives are all tied
in some way to the taxable wage base. Thus, one appropriate inte-
gration level would be a particular individual's covered compensa-
tion.11 4 In other cases, an appropriate integration level, applied on
a year-by-year basis, would be the taxable wage base for the partic-
ular year in question.115 Another appropriate integration level is a
for 1975; $15,300 for 1976; $16,500 for 1977; $17,700 for 1978; $22,900 for 1979; $25,900 for
1980; $29,700 for 1981; $32,400 for 1982; and $35,700 for 1983.
112. Rev. Rul. 71-446, §§ 2.05-2.07, 1971-2 C.B. 187, 188.
113. Id. § 2.05, 1971-2 C.B. at 187.
114. Id. §§ 5.01, 6.01, 14, 15, 1971-2 C.B. at 189, 190, 194.
115. Id. §§ 6.01, 14, 15, 1971-2 C.B. at 190, 194.
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stated dollar amount which is less than one of the IRS prescribed
integration levels.11
The second facet of the excess method integration rules in-
volves the prescription of limits on the percentages of contribu-
tions or benefits with respect to compensation above the integra-
tion level. Different limits are prescribed depending on the type of
plan involved. For these purposes, defined benefit plans are bifur-
cated into "flat benefit plans" and "unit benefit plans."
A "flat benefit plan" is a defined benefit plan whose benefit
formula does not take years of service into account. The current
flat benefit plan rules limit the percentage of benefits with respect
to compensation above the integration level to 37.5%. 11 Thus, a
flat benefit plan would be appropriately integrated if it provided a
retirement benefit equal to 37.5% of the participant's average com-
pensation in excess of an acceptable integration level.
A "unit benefit plan" is a defined benefit plan whose benefit
formula does take years of service into account. With respect to
each year of service, a unit benefit plan may not provide a benefit
exceeding 1% of the participant's average compensation in excess
of an acceptable integration level."1
Defined contribution plans are subject to yet another excess
method percentage limit. Until recently, contributions and forfeit-
ures allocated to participant's accounts in defined contribution
plans could not exceed 7% of the compensation above the integra-
tion level.1 " TEFRA replaced the 7% limit with the rate of the
social security tax imposed on the employer each year for Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI).1 20 The current
(1983) rate of 5.4% will gradually escalate to 6.2% by 1990.121
An acceptable and commonly employed variation of the excess
method is the so-called "step-rate method." This method allows an
116. Id. §§ 5.01, 6.01, 14, 15, 1971-2 C.B. at 189, 190, 194.
117. Id. § 5.02, 1971-2 C.B. at 189. However, the fiat benefit is reduced by 2.5% for
each year of service below 15. Id. For example, an employee retiring with 13 years of service
would be entitled to a fiat benefit equal to 32.5% [37.5 - (2 X 2.5)] of the amount by which
his average annual compensation exceeded the integration level.
118. Id. § 6.03, 1971-2 C.B. at 190. However, if average compensation is determined by
reference to the compensation paid over the entire career of the employee, a 1.4% benefit
may be paid for each year of service. Id. § 6.02. In this situation, the benefit formula would
be 1.4% X (years of service) X (average compensation in excess of the integration level).
119. Id. §§ 14.01, 15.02, 1971-2 C.B. at 194.
120. I.R.C. § 401.
121. Id. § 3111(a)(5), (7).
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increase in the percentage limits for contributions or benefits with
respect to compensation above the integration level so long as
there is a corresponding increase for contributions or benefits be-
low the integration level.122 Thus, while the limit for flat benefits
with respect to compensation above the integration level may be
37.5%, this limit could be raised, for example, by 12.5% up to
50%, so long as a 12.5% benefit is then paid with respect to com-
pensation below the integration level.123 In this same vein, if the
1983 5.4% limit for contributions with respect to compensation
above the integration level were raised by 4.6%, up to 10%, then
contributions of 4.6% would be required with respect to compensa-
tion below the integration level.
Instead of the excess method, a defined benefit plan may em-
ploy the "offset method" of integration. Under this method, the
employee's benefit is computed as it normally would be if the the
plan were not integrated. However, the benefit is offset by a cer-
tain percentage of the social security benefit to which the employee
is entitled at retirement.124 Currently, the upper limit for the offset
is 83.33% .125 For example, a defined benefit plan would be prop-
erly integrated if it provided a retirement benefit equal to 50% of
average compensation less 83.33% of the social security benefit re-
ceivable by the retiring employee.1
28
B. Legislative Consideration of Integration
In its 1974 ERISA deliberations, the House Ways and Means
Committee made the following statement about integration:
[T]he objective of Congress in increasing social security benefits might be
considered to be frustrated to the extent that individuals with low and mod-
erate income have their private retirement benefits reduced as a result of the
integration procedures. On the other hand, your committee is very much
122. Rev. Rul. 71-446, § 16, 1971-2 C.B. 187, 194-95.
123. An example of a unit benefit plan step-rate formula would be:
.5% X (years of service) X (average compensation below the integration level)
plus
1.5% X (years of service) X (average compensation above the integration level).
Since .5% was added to the normal 1% limit (assuming an average of only the last 5 years
of compensation) with respect to average compensation above the integration level, that .5%
is also applied with respect to average compensation below the integration level.
124. Rev. Rul. 71-446, § 2.07, 1971-2 C.B. 187, 188.
125. Id. § 7.01, 1971-2 C.B. at 190.
126. See infra note 160 for an example of the offset method.
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aware that many present plans are fully or partially integrated and that elim-
ination of the integration procedures could substantially increase the cost of
financing private plans. Employees, as a whole, might be injured rather than
aided if such cost increases resulted in slowing down the rate of growth of
private retirement plans.
127
With these competing considerations in mind, the Committee de-
cided to continue allowing the use of integration.12s However, it did
decide to prohibit integrated plans from using post-retirement in-
creases in the taxable wage base or social security benefit levels to
reduce the retirement benefit of a retired employee. 129 The Confer-
ence Committee of the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee decided to go one step further by freez-
ing integration at the 1971 social security levels until July 1,
1976.130 However, after reportedly receiving a tremendous outcry of
protest from employers, banks, and life insurance companies, Con-
gress relented and deleted the freeze provision.131
As part of its massive 1978 tax reform program, 3 2 the Carter
administration proposed a number of changes that, it contended,
would render the integration rules more equitable in the treatment
of lower-paid persons. 183 The basic theme of these proposals was to
assure the provision of some benefits for the lower-paid. Thus, any
excess plan lacking step-rate features would have been elimi-
nated.13 4 Moreover, all step-rate excess plans would have been sub-
ject to a maximum 180% rule.3 5 Under this rule, contributions or
benefits attributable to compensation above the integration level
could be no more than 180% of the contributions or benefits at-
tributable to compensation below the integration level."36 For ex-
ample, if a 9% contribution was to be made with respect to com-
127. ERISA REPORT, supra note 74, at 29, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 4696.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 280-81 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5061.
131. H.R. Con. Res. 609, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 29,216-19, 29,925-28
(1974).
132. H.R. 12,078, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 9933 (1970).
133. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESmENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM, FACT SHEET
20 (1978) [hereinafter cited as THE PREsmENT's TAx PROGRAM].
134. H.R. 12,078, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. § 251(2) (1978).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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pensation above the integration level, a 5% contribution would be
required with respect to compensation below the integration
level. 137 These proposals also contained a change in the offset plan
rules. Under this proposed change, the percentage of offset could
not exceed the percentage that was used to establish the benefit.""8
For example, if a defined benefit plan called for a benefit equal to
50% of average compensation, the percentage of offset could not
exceed 50%.
While most of the Carter tax proposals were accepted, the
House Ways and Means Committee, without debate,139 deleted the
integration proposals from the bill. When the bill came up for con-
sideration in the Senate, the Carter administration sought to re-
vive a number of proposals that had been deleted by the House
Ways and Means Committee. 140 However, no attempt was made to
revive the integration proposals.
In 1982, Congressman Rangel introduced H.R. 6410,141 which
contained, inter alia, a number of changes pertaining to integra-
tion. One of these changes, which was ultimately enacted as part of
TEFRA, reduced the 7% rate, for contributions above the integra-
tion level, to the OASDI tax rate.142 The current (1983) rate of
5.4% will gradually escalate to 6.2% by 1990.14' Two other pro-
posed changes were not enacted. The first change would have lim-
ited the offset by a defined benefit plan to the annual annuity that
could be purchased by the employer's actual OASDI tax payments
with respect to the particular employee involved.1 44 The purpose of
this change was to preclude an employer (or employers) from
claiming an offset attributable to the OASDI contributions made
by previous employers of the employee. 145 The other change pro-
137. 5% X 1.8 = 9%.
138. See supra note 134.
139. These proposals were discussed before, but not acted upon by, other House non-
tax committees. See, e.g., National Pension Policies, Private Pension Plans: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Retirement Income & Employment of the Select Comm, on Aging,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-50 (1978) (statement of D. Halperin, Tax Legislative Counsel, Dep't
of the Treas.).
140. Hearings on H.R. 13511 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 130-201 (1978) (statement of W. Blumenthal, Sec'y of the Treas.).
141. H.R. 6410, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
142. Id. § 4.
143. I.R.C. § 3111(a)(5), (7).
144. See supra note 142.
145. REVENUE OPTIoNs, supra note 100, at 66-67.
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vided a so-called "1-2-1" safe harbor rule for defined benefit plans
which were integrated under the excess method. 146 Under this pro-
posal, benefits based on compensation exceeding $60,000 could be
no greater than benefits based on compensation below $30,000,
whereas benefits based on compensation falling between $30,000
and $60,000 could be twice those based on compensation above
and below this range.14
C. TEFRA's Top-Heavy Rules
TEFRA contained the "top-heavy" rules 148 which, when appli-
cable, modify the consequences of the integration rules in certain
instances. These rules affect those qualified plans which are con-
sidered to be weighted too heavily in favor of "key employees"
such as officers, employees with the ten largest ownership interests
in the employer, employees with at least 5 % ownership interests in
the employer, and employees with at least both 1% ownership in-
terests in the employer and annual compensation of $150,000.149
Thus, a plan is considered "top-heavy," and, therefore, subject to a
number of special requirements, if, as of the "determination
date,"150 the accrued benefits151 for the key employees exceed 60%
of the accrued benefits of all participants. 15 2 Obviously, the quali-
fied plans of smaller, closely-held companies will be more apt to
become subject to these provisions.53
If a plan is top-heavy, then it will become subject to a number
of special rules, one of which is the requirement that all "non-key
employees"'154 receive minimum contributions or benefits.' 55 Thus,
146. See supra note 142.
147. H.R. 6410, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
148. See LR.C. § 416.
149. Id. § 416(i)(1).
150. Generally, the "determination date" with respect to the current plan year is the
last date of the preceding plan year. Id. § 416(g)(4)(C).
151. "Accrued benefits" refers to amounts accrued under both defined benefit and de-
fined contribution plans. See id. § 411(a)(7)(A).
152. Id. § 416(g)(1)(A)(i).
153. The prospect of a plan being top-heavy increases as the ratio of higher-paid par-
ticipants to rank and file participants increases. Moreover, since integration allocates a dis-
proportionate amount of plan benefits or contribhtions to the higher-paid, this prospect is
further increased when the plan is integrated. Thus, in contrast to the larger companies,
small, closely-held companies with integrated plans are far more likely to have top-heavy
plans.
154. LR.C. § 416(i)(2).
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for each non-key employee-participant, a top-heavy defined contri-
bution plan is required to make a minimum annual contribution
equal to 3 % of compensation. 156 For each year that a defined bene-
fit plan is top-heavy, each non-key employee-participant must ac-
crue a benefit equal to 2% of his average compensation.15 This
minimum benefit rule becomes inapplicable after the employee has
accumulated an accrued benefit equal to 20% of average
compensation. 15
To the extent that they would cause a non-key employee-par-
ticipant in a top-heavy plan to receive less than the prescribed
minimum contributions or benefits, the integration rules must give
way to the top-heavy rules.159 When applicable, these minimum
rules will impact least upon those step-rate excess plans which pro-
vide some contribution or benefit with respect to compensation
falling below the integration level. There is a greater likelihood
that the impact will be felt by those top-heavy defined benefit
plans which are integrated under the offset method, particularly
where the offset is as high as 83.33% and the employee is at the
lower end of the wage scale.160
155. See id. § 416(c).
156. Id. § 416(c)(2)(A). However, a less than 3% contribution may be made if that
same percentage is contributed for the key employees and these employees are not covered
by a defined benefit plan. Id. § 416(c)(2)(B). Compare note 157 regarding an employer with
both defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
157. Id. § 416(c)(1). Generally, average compensation is determined by reference to the
participant's five consecutive years of highest compensation from the employer. Id. §
416(c)(1)(D). Both the minimum benefit and minimum contribution need not be provided
where the employer has a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan. Id. § 416(f).
Generally, in this situation, the proposed regulations call for the provision of the 2% mini-
mum benefit rather than the 3% minimum contribution. See 48 Fed. Reg. 10,869 (1983) (to
be codified at Tress. Reg. § 1.146-1) (proposed Mar. 15, 1983); see also Questions and An-
swers on Top Heavy Plans at M-1O: What minimum contribution or benefit must be re-
ceived by a non-key employee?, 5 Fan. TAXEs (P-H) 19,580. A number of other options are
provided. Id.
158. I.R.C. § 416(c)(1)(B)(ii).
159. Id. § 416(e).
160. In many cases, a high percentage offset either nearly or completely eliminates the
pension benefit of lower-paid employees. For example, in the case of a defined benefit plan
which provides a 2% benefit for each year of service, subject to an 83.3% OASDI offset, an
employee with average annual earnings of $10,000, 20 years of service, and an approximate
annual Social Security benefit of $5880, would receive no pension benefit as a result of the
offset (pension benefit of $4000 ($10,000 X .02 X 20) less offset of $4900 (83.33% X
$5880)). Many large employers reportedly do not use the highest allowable (83.33%) offset.
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D. Is Integration Justified?
The previous analysis of the contribution and benefit limita-
tions casts substantial doubt as to whether the qualified plan sys-
tem is worth maintaining in its current state. The following analy-
sis of the integration process casts further significant doubt upon
the merit of this system.
Consider the hypothetical case of a company that has a
nonintegrated money purchase plan which, in 1983, covers four
participants-three rank and file individuals, A, B, and C, annually
earning $10,000, $15,000, and $20,000, respectively, and one stock-
holder-executive, D, annually earning $150,000. The plan makes
contributions equal to 8.4% of compensation, resulting in contri-
butions for A, B, C, and D of $840, $1260, $1680, and $12,600, re-
spectively. Assuming marginal tax brackets of 14, 16, 18, and 50%,
the resulting percentages of tax deferral subsidy to compensation
for A, B, C, and D are approximately 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, and 4.2, respec-
tively.161 Thus, D's percentage of tax deferral subsidy to compensa-
tion is approximately three to three and a half times as great as
those percentages for A, B, and C.1 6 2
Assume now that, with an integration level of $20,000, the
plan is integrated on the step-rate basis of 3% below the integra-
tion level and 8.4% above that level."1 3 The contributions for A, B,
C, and D in 1983 would be $300, $450, $600, and $11,520, respec-
161. With a marginal tax rate of 14%, the amount of tax deferral for A is $117.60 (14%
of $840 contribution). The percentage of tax deferral to compensation for A is therefore 1.17
($117.60 - $10,000). With a marginal tax rate of 16%, the amount of tax deferral for B is
$201.60 (16% of $1260 contribution). The percentage of tax deferral to compensation for B
is therefore 1.34 ($201.60 - $15,000). With a marginal tax rate of 18%, the amount of tax
deferral for C is $302.40 (18% of $1680 contribution). The percentage of tax deferral to
compensation for C is therefore 1.51 ($302.40 - $20,000). With a marginal tax rate of 50%,
the amount of tax deferral for D is $6300 (50% of $12,600 contribution). The percentage of
tax deferral to compensation for D is therefore 4.2 ($6300 + $150,000).
162. The percentage of tax deferral to compensation for D, 4.2, is 3.6, 3.1, and 2.8 times
as great as those of A, B, and C, respectively.
163. The highest permissible integration level is the current taxable wage base, which
(in 1983) is $35,700. Rev. Rul. 71-446, §§ 6.01, 14.01, 1971-2 C.B. 187. However, a stated
level such as $20,000, which is below the highest permissible amount, may be used as the
integration level. Id. The rate for contributions above the integration level is 5.4% more
than the rate for contributions below the integration level (8.4% - 3%). The plan complies
with the limits on contributions above the integration level since the 5.4% differential does
not exceed the current (1983) OASDI tax rate (5.4%). LR.C. § 401(1); Rev. Rul. 71-446, §
16, 1971-2 C.B. 187, 194 (Step-Rate Excess Plans).
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tively.164 The resulting percentages of tax deferral subsidy to com-
pensation for A, B, C, and D are approximately .4, .5, .5, and 3.8,
respectively. 16 5 Thus, the percentage of D's salary that is subject to
the tax deferral subsidy is seven to nine times as great as those
percentages for the rank and file employees.6 6 As a result of the
use of the relatively moderate step-rate excess method of integra-
tion, the annual contribution for each of the rank and file employ-
ees is approximately one-third ($300 - $840, $450 ' $1260, $600
- $1680) of the contribution that would be made in their behalf
had the plan not been integrated. In contrast, the annual contribu-
tion for D is approximately 91% of the contribution under the
nonintegrated plan ($11,520 - $12,600).
The hypothetical plans described above reveal a number of
disturbing facts about the qualified plan subsidy. First, as previ-
ously discussed, the subsidy increases as the recipient's marginal
tax bracket increases.6 7 In other words, government assistance in-
creases as the need for this assistance decreases. Second, integra-
tion compounds the already perverted allocation of this subsidy.
Last, integration severely cuts into the retirement security that
lower- and middle-income individuals can look to as a supplement
to social security.
The principal justification for integration is that the skewing
of the qualified plan system in favor of higher-paid individuals
provides an appropriate counterbalance to the social security sys-
tem's weighting of benefits in favor of lower-paid individuals.6 8
164. The contribution for A is 3% of $10,000, or $300. The contribution for B is 3% of
$15,000, or $450. The contribution for C is 3% of $20,000, or $600. The contribution for D is
3% of $20,000 plus 8.4% of $130,000 ($150,000 - $20,000), or $11,520.
165. With a marginal tax rate of 14%, the amount of tax deferral for A is $42 (14% of
$300 contribution). The percentage of tax deferral to compensation for A is therefore .42
($42 - $10,000). With a marginal tax rate of 16%, the amount of tax deferral for B is $72
(16% of $450 contribution). The percentage of tax deferral to compensation for B is there-
fore .48 ($72 - $15,000). With a marginal tax rate of 18%, the amount of tax deferral for C
is $108 (18% of $600 contribution). The percentage of tax deferral to compensation for C is
therefore .54 ($108 - $20,000). With a marginal tax rate of 50%, the amount of tax deferral
for D is $5760 (50% of $11,520 contribution). The percentage of tax deferral to compensa-
tion for D is therefore 3.84 ($5760 - $150,000).
166. D's percentage of tax deferral to compensation, 3.84, is 7.1 times as great as that of
C (3.84- .54), 8 times as great as that of B (3.84 - .48), and 9.1 times as great as that of A
(3.84 - .42).
167. THE PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAx PROGRAM, supra note 128, at 2.
168. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INsTrrUTE [EBRI], PENSION INTEGRATION: CONCEPTS,
ISSUES AND PROPOSALS 39-41 (1983).
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This counterbalance, it is argued, results in the provision of some-
thing approaching equally proportionate retirement benefits for all
employees.169 Perhaps in some sort of conceptual vacuum, there
may be a seductively logical charm to the proposition that each
individual, regardless of the amount of his income, is entitled to
the same percentage or proportion of retirement benefits. But
when this proposition is applied in the context of governmentally
subsidized programs whose purpose is to assist in providing retire-
ment security, the result is absurd.
Social security places a ceiling on the amount of earnings (cov-
ered compensation) 170 to be taken into account in determining re-
tirement benefits. Consequently, the payment of the same amount
of benefits to two individuals-one whose average earnings equal
covered compensation and the other whose average earnings ex-
ceed covered compensation-results in a greater percentage of
wage replacement for the lower-compensated individual. Moreover,
within the upper boundary set by covered compensation, there is a
segmented benefit structure that provides a decreasing scale of
benefits as average earnings increase.1 7 1 Thus, the ratio of benefits
to average earnings is higher for an individual with $5000 of aver-
age earnings than that for an individual with $10,000 of average
earnings.
The underlying premise of the social security benefit structure
is that less financial assistance is required as disposable income
and, with it, the ability to save increases. Like so many other
governmental social welfare programs which are targeted at indi-
viduals who are in need of financial assistance in order to have ad-
equate food, clothing, and shelter, there is a resulting redistribu-
tion of income from higher-income individuals to lower-income
individuals. The extent of this aid is the subject of endless debate.
But very few would argue that this aid should be provided on an
equally proportionate basis to all income classes. Thus, although
the government provides subsidized low-rent apartment housing to
lower-income individuals, it would be nonsensical to provide subsi-
dized low-rent mansions to higher-income individuals;17 3 these in-
169. Id. at 6.
170. See supra notes 110 and 111.
171. McGM.L, supra note 110, at 177.
172. See H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1935).
173. To the equally proportionate argument, Dianne Bennett responds:
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dividuals do not need governmental assistance in this regard. Yet,
the logic of the integration proponents would call for this result.
17 4
Given the accepted approach of social security to the payment
of benefits, does it make any sense to try to counterbalance its dis-
tributional effect by using integration to severely skew qualified
plan benefits in favor of the higher-paid? Surely, an employer and
an employee have the right to agree as to how compensation will
be paid for services rendered. Whether it is paid currently or on
some deferred basis, no one-not the government or some aca-
demic-should have the right to dictate how that compensation
should be paid. Thus, if an employer wants to increase the current
or deferred compensation of higher-paid employees in order to bal-
ance out the social security benefit bias in favor of the lower-paid,
the employer should and is free to do so. However, it is counter-
productive for the government to provide a substantial subsidy as
a bonus for this exercise of free enterprise. No governmental inter-
est is served by providing financial assistance to those who do not
need it. To the contrary, the government and its taxpayers are dis-
served by integration because it prevents the qualified plan from
serving its logical purpose-affording supplemental retirement
subsistence to those least able to provide it for themselves. The
failure of the qualified plan to serve this role results in greater
pressure being brought to bear on Congress to once again increase
the benefits paid by the already overburdened social security
system.
Some integration proponents concede that this process can re-
sult in the provision of relatively insignificant benefits for the
lower paid.1 5 They argue, however, that because social security
provides adequate retirement benefits for lower and middle-income
workers, qualified plans are not needed to supplement these work-
If we carried this argument to its logical extreme, we would have a tax benefit to
balance every government program that expended monies on a particular income
class. There would be a tax benefit for high paid persons' medical care because
Medicare or Medicaid tend to favor lower-paid persons. There would be a tax
benefit for high paid persons' use of cars and planes because government funds
are expended on mass transit, which is used by lower-paid persons.
D. BENNETr, TYPED STATEMENT SUBMITTED TO PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION POLICY,
HEARINGS ON SOCL SECURITY INTEGRATION, S. REP. No. 70, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979).
174. For arguments against the present integration rules but in favor of the concept of
subsidized proportionate wage replacement, see Halperin, Retirement Security and Tax Eq-
uity: An Evaluation of ERISA, 17 B.C.L. Rxv. 739, 762-64 (1976).
175. EBRI, supra note 168, at 39.
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ers' retirement incomes.1 76 Since the only justifiable purpose of the
retirement savings subsidy is to provide a dignified retirement sub-
sistence for the typical low- and middle-income worker, there
would be no justification for the qualified plan subsidy if social se-
curity already served this purpose.177 However, most would con-
cede that social security does not fulfill this need. Consequently,
the qualified plan or some other savings system is necessary to pro-
vide the lower and middle-income worker with a meaningful sup-
plement to the retirement benefits provided by social security.
Few would argue that, like social security, the qualified plan
system should be skewed in favor of the rank and file. Notwith-
standing the bias in favor of higher-paid employees that results
from higher marginal tax brackets, few would argue against quali-
fied plans providing proportional benefits to all employees with re-
spect to a modest level of compensation, such as the median salary
of American workers. But a subsidized qualified plan system that
provides sizeable benefits to the higher-paid and, as a direct result
of integration, merely trickles down relatively insignificant benefits
for the rank and file, cannot be justified as a worthwhile govern-
mental social program.
Another major argument for integration is that it prevents a
lower-income worker from receiving combined social security and
qualified plan benefits which exceed 100% of his pre-retirement
income. 178 It should first be observed that, while theoretically pos-
sible, the "windfall" of over-100% combined benefits is, as a prac-
tical matter, a relatively rare occurrence for the lower-income
worker. 179 Most of these individuals tend to be transient in terms
of employment and, consequently, do not work long enough for one
employer (e.g., 20 years) to accumulate a vested accrued benefit
which, when aggregated with social security, would result in an
over-100% combined benefit.180
It is possible that some low-income individuals who have
worked a considerable number of years for one employer with a
nonintegrated qualified plan will experience over-100% combined
benefits. However, because qualified plan benefits, unlike those of
176. Id.
177. THE PRESDENT'S 1978 TAx PROGRAM, supra note 133, at 151.
178. EBRI, supra note 168, at 40-47.
179. BENNErr, supra note 173, at 4.
180. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION POLICY, supra note 1, at 28, 30-31.
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social security, are rarely subject to post-retirement adjustments,
inflation can quickly turn an over-100% combined benefit into an
under-100% combined benefit.181 But, even assuming that com-
bined benefits continue to exceed 100%, further inquiry should be
made as to the role, if any, that the qualified plan has in this
situation.
Many experts now agree that the amounts contributed by em-
ployers to qualified plans represent deferred wages for work per-
formed by the employee.18 2 In other words, the employer is taking
the qualified plan contribution into account in determining the
overall amount of compensation that the employee's services war-
rant. Put yet another way, amounts set aside in a qualified plan on
an employee's behalf are earned-employers in a private enterprise
system are not in the habit of making gifts. Thus, it can hardly be
argued that any benefits received from a qualified plan represent a
windfall-they directly correspond to the quantity of work per-
formed at particular skill levels.
If there is any culpability for the relatively rare over-100%
combined benefit situation, it would have to be attributed to the
social security system. In the various amendments of the social se-
curity laws, Congress has reaffirmed the policy of providing a sub-
stantially higher percentage of benefits with respect to the lower
levels of pre-retirement income.8" Seemingly, the over-100% bene-
fit concern of the integration proponents could be more intelli-
gently and efficiently addressed by the enactment of a new social
security rule which would reduce social security benefits in the
181. BENNMTr, supra note 173, at 4.
182. PRESMENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION POLICY, supra note 1, at 30; EBRI, supra note
168, at 49. A related issue is whether the employer actually bears the cost of its Social
Security contributions. A number of studies have concluded that employees ultimately pay
most of the Social Security contributions indirectly; e.g., in lower wages and slower wage
growth. Id. Moreover, attribution of 50% of the total Social Security benefit to an em-
ployer's contributions can be challenged on other grounds. Social Security is a pay-as-you-go
system; i.e., benefits paid to retirees in the current year are derived from Social Security
taxes paid by employees and their employers in the current year. Currently, the Social Se-
curity contributions of every three employees and their employers pay the Social Security
benefits of a single retiree. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION POLICY, supra note 1, at 23-24,
28. This 3:1 ratio is projected to fall to 2:1 by the year 2035. Id. Since each retiree is being
supported by several younger workers and their employers, it is argued that it is fallacious
to attribute a certain percentage of the cost of a particular employee's future benefits to his
present employer's contributions. EBRI, supra note 160, at 48-49.
183. D. McGILL, supra note 110, at 11-12.
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event that this situation arose. Instead of punishing all of the low-
and middle-income individuals now subject to the integration
rules, this social security rule would eradicate the problem at its
source by reducing the benefits of those few low-income individu-
als who have over-100% combined benefits.
Perhaps the real crucible of integration is whether its conse-
quences would be acceptable today in the context of a direct ap-
propriated subsidy. There should be no doubt that if it was now
considering the issue for the first time, Congress would refuse to
grant a direct $35-$65 billion subsidy to encourage retirement sav-
ings where that subsidy would be allocated disproportionately to
higher-income individuals and, in many cases, would provide negli-
gible aid to lower- and middle-income individuals.
If Congress would reject the qualified plan subsidy in the form
of a direct appropriated subsidy, why has it accepted this subsidy
in the form of a tax expenditure? Unlike the hypothetical appro-
priation review described above, Congress is not dealing with a
proposed subsidy; it is confronted by a longstanding and politically
entrenched subsidy. The political strength and persuasiveness of
those parties whose interests are served by integration are formida-
ble. This was illustrated in 1974, when interested employers,
banks, insurance companies, and actuaries orchestrated a last min-
ute protest which succeeded in persuading Congress to overturn a
conference-voted temporary freeze on the integration rules.'" The
protestors persuaded Congress that many qualified plans would
terminate as a result of the temporary freeze. Undoubtedly, the
prospect of a congressional repeal of integration would evoke an
even more vehement protest.
As discussed in relation to lowered contribution and benefit
limits, no real loss is suffered upon the termination of those quali-
fied plans that were providing little or no benefits to the rank and
file employees. Moreover, threats notwithstanding, many qualified
plans would be continued because of the relative security that they
provide in contrast to unfunded, nonqualified plans. However,
more than a negligible number of qualified plans that currently
provide some benefits for the rank and file would probably termi-
nate as a result of the elimination of integration, particularly if
this elimination is coupled with lowered contribution and benefit
184. See supra note 131.
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limits. Again, the same quandry is presented: Should this tax sub-
sidy be reduced and reallocated if, by doing so, it would cause
many low- and middle-income qualified plan participants to lose
the opportunity to earn any further retirement benefits?
It is submitted that the price of the present qualified plan sys-
tem has risen to an unacceptable level. A nation suffering from
$200 billion deficits and rapidly decreasing respect for its tax laws
cannot afford a $35-$65 billion retirement subsidy which provides
disproportionately high benefits for executives and only meager
benefits for many low- and middle-income workers. For those low-
and middle-income workers who are suddenly left out in the cold,
and for those who have always been out in the cold, a new retire-
ment savings system must be devised.
IV. A NEW RETIREMENT SAVINGS SYSTEM
Approximately 50% of the private sector workforce is em-
ployed by companies which have never established a qualified
plan.115 Most of these uncovered individuals are lower- and mid-
dle-income workers.18 6 Thus, social security serves as the only po-
tential source of retirement security for the staggering number of
lower- and middle-income workers who are presently uncovered
and those who would join their ranks as a consequence of qualified
plan terminations. These workers could set up their own IRA187
accounts to which deductible contributions could be made. How-
ever, as previously discussed, individuals at the lower end of the
disposable income scale have little ability and inclination to avail
themselves of this tax-subsidized retirement device. As one would
suspect, most of the IRAs have been established by high-income
individuals. 118
The only solution to this problem lies in some form of mini-
mum mandatory contribution for each employee. The idea of
mandatory contributions is not novel. In the United States, the
President's Commission on Pension Policy issued a report in 1981
which detailed the substantial gaps in coverage of the lower-paid
and called for the institution of a mandatory contribution
185. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION POLICY, supra note 1, at 21-29.
186. Id.
187. See supra note 90.
188. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION POLICY, supra note 1, at 34-35.
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system.18 9
The exact specifications of a mandatory contribution system
are the subjects of another article. However, certain suggestions as
to the key elements can be made now. If the minimum contribu-
tion (e.g., 3 or 4%) was not being made to a qualified plan on an
employee's behalf, the employer would be required to make that
contribution either to an employer-administered fund or to a cen-
tralized fund administered by a governmental agency. An upper
limitation (e.g., $2000 - $2500), subject to periodic cost of living
increases, would be placed on the annual contribution that could
be made for an employee. Each employee would have a separate
100% vested account reflecting the contributions and earnings
thereon. The employer would deduct the contribution currently
while the employee would exclude that amount from income. Tax-
ation of the contributions and earnings thereon would be deferred
to the time of distribution. In terms of the percentage of compen-
sation that is being subsidized, the relatively low contribution limit
would substantially narrow the gap that now exists between lower-
and higher-income employees.190
A number of facts about a mandatory system must be faced.
Like employer contributions to already existing qualified plans, the
cost of mandatory contributions would either be passed on to the
consumer and/or serve to reduce the current compensation of the
employee. It is likely that a significant part of these contributions
would reduce current compensation. To that extent, we would be
establishing a withholding system requiring employees to set aside
some of their disposable income for retirement security. Conse-
quently, we have yet another instance of government protection
and bureaucratic regulation that many individuals would under-
standably resent during their pre-retirement years. But, when the
alternative is considered-that of countless millions of individuals
unable to subsist on social security during their retirement
years-this forced savings program clearly becomes necessary. The
189. Id. at 42-52. In 1981, a hearing was held to discuss this report, but no further
legislative action was taken. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION POLICY:
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON SAVINGS, PENSIONS, & INVESTMENT POLICY OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON FINANCE, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
190. That gap could be eliminated in most cases by a somewhat more complicated tax
credit provision. Under this provision, the employee would include the contribution in in-
come, but would be entitled to claim a refundable tax credit equal to 20-25% of the amount
of that contribution.
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formulation and implementation of such a program should not be
delayed.
CONCLUSION
The only justifiable purpose of the extraordinarily large quali-
fied plan tax subsidy is to provide the rank and file with an ade-
quate retirement income supplement to that provided by social se-
curity. Yet, as a result of high contribution and benefit limits and
integration with social security, the current qualified plan system
provides lavish retirement benefits to the higher-paid, while at the
same time depriving many rank and file of any meaningful retire-
ment security. Therefore, in order to attain a more rational and
humane allocation of this subsidy, the qualified plan rules should
be changed so that integration would be eliminated and the contri-
bution and benefit limits would be lowered to median-income
levels. These changes would not impinge upon the rights of higher-
paid employees to amass large amounts of retirement savings.
However, they would reduce appropriately the extent to which this
country subsidizes these savings.
Some qualified plans would terminate as a result of these
changes. For those rank and file who lose coverage as a result of
qualified plan terminations, and, more importantly, for those rank
and fie who have never been covered, a mandatory minimum con-
tribution system should be instituted in order to assure these indi-
viduals of an adequate retirement subsistence.
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